States' efforts to provide law and order can be counterproductive: mass incarceration policies, while incapacitating and deterring individual criminals, can simultaneously strengthen collective criminal networks. Prison gangs, by promising rewards and punishments inside prison to those who anticipate incarceration, can control criminal activity on the street. A formal model reveals that common crime-reduction policies, by making incarceration more likely and sentences harsher, can increase prison gangs' power over street-level actors. Leading cases from across the Americas corroborate these predictions: periods of sharply rising incarceration, partly driven by anti-gang laws, preceded qualitative leaps in prison-gang projection of power onto the street. Prison gangs use their capacity to project power not only for criminal governance, but to orchestrate violenceor intentionally curtail it-providing them critical leverage over the state. Thus, even if increased incarceration reduces crime rates, it may do so by strengthening prison-gang power at the expense of state authority.
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Figure 1. Individual and Collective Effects of Incarceration on State Authority
Central America become major political protagonists, surpassing insurgency as the foremost threat to state authority.
The implications are dire: state efforts to curb crime can inadvertently undermine state authority.
Plunging crime rates may not reflect the restoration of state authority, but rather the organization of the criminal underworld into a powerful prison-based collective capable of holding state and society hostage to its demands. Herein lies the danger of studying only individual-level effects of incarceration like incapacitation and deterrence on easily measured outcomes like crime rates.
Instead, in the sixth section, I nest both individual and collective effects within a theoretical framework that considers the impacts of incarceration on state authority (Figure 1) . A rough scholarly consensus, captured by the solid line, finds that the net individual effects of incarceration (reducing crime and thus restoring state authority) are large at low levels of incarceration, where basic social order is established, but diminish and may become negative at higher levels. The overarching claim of this article is that incarceration can also have collective effects, depicted by the thick dashed line, that strengthen prison gangs at the expense of state authority. The total effect of incarceration on state authority, the vertical sum of individual and collective effects, can thus become negative, implying an inflection point beyond which further incarceration-even if crime-reducing-ultimately erodes the state's legitimate authority.
2 Background Lessing (2010) analyzes prison gangs' growth in terms of three overlapping dynamics: consolidation of control over prison life; propagation throughout a prison system; and projection of coercive power beyond the prison walls. This article focuses on projection and the uses to which prison gangs put it; in this section, I briefly discuss consolidation-and the common state response of segregating incoming prisoners by gang affiliation-and propagation because together they define a prison gang's "coercive jurisdiction": the set of outside actors to whom it can credibly promise rewards and punishments. Such promises are the key to projecting power.
Successful gangs consolidate power inside prisons by eliminating or subjugating rivals, taking control of key aspects of prison life (including contraband flows), and securing the capacity to reward and punish inmates. While early stages may witness brutal violence among fledgling groups (e.g. Amorim 1993, 35; Blatchford 2008, 6; Salla 2007, 82 ) once a gang achieves primacy it can impose rules, indeed a whole social order, that reduce violence among members and sometimes the larger inmate population (Dias 2011) . Welfare and public-goods provision can win a gang further prestige and loyalty. 
Modeling Projection of Power
Why do people on the streets obey the orders of prison-gang leaders who may spend the rest of their lives behind bars? An L.A. Sheriff's Department sergeant testified that "the Eme controls the prisons and the [street] gangsters know that eventually they'll end up in prison and be subject to sanctions and retribution if they don't obey the Eme while they're on the street" (Rafael 2007, 326) . A former drug boss I interviewed in Rio put it even more simply: "Whatever you do on the outside, on the inside you'll have to answer for it."
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As Skarbek (2011) notes, this logic depends on street-level actors' belief that future incarceration is likely. Yet this likelihood, and hence the force that this logic carries, varies in accordance with state policy. So too does the severity-in both length and intensity-of imprisonment, which prison gangs ameliorate through protection and other member benefits. If state crackdowns make street-level actors more likely to go to prison, or make imprisonment harsher, those actors should have stronger motivation to stay in good standing with a prison gang that can protect them on the inside. At the same time, the "price" of such good standing may involve taking risky actions that increase actors' chance of incarceration. Finally, state crackdowns alter the basic Beckerian calculus about whether to be a criminal in the first place: the point of mass-incarceration policies, presumably, is to make non-criminal outside options relatively more attractive and thereby reduce the crime rate as a whole.
To rigorously analyze these interactions, and clarify the conditions under which changes in state policy might strengthen prison gangs' power on the street, I develop a simple formal model. It focuses on two sets of independent variables: the first concerns the prison gang's ability to reward cooperation and punish defection, especially to ameliorate the pain of imprisonment; the second set concerns incarceration itself: the "certainty" (likelihood of incarceration) and "severity" (length of sentences, prison conditions, etc.) of punishment. While the first set are treated as parameters (i.e. relatively stable), 7 Author interview, August 17, 2009 the second are directly affected by state policy. I first examine "ideal-type" policies that affect severity and certainty independently, then turn to more realistic scenarios where increases in certainty result, through overcrowding and related channels, in concomitant increases in severity.
I test these policy effects on two outcomes, which we can think of as the intensive margin (the gang's ability to impose taxes and other burdens on members) and the extensive (recruiting new members).
For the intensive margin, the outcome of interest is the largest burden that can be imposed on outside affiliates (such as street gangs and/or drug retailers) as the price of gang membership or good standing.
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This burden can be a money tax, such as those charged by the Eme and the PCC on their streetlevel affiliates, but it might also involve taking risky actions, obeying prohibitions or other rules, or a combination of all three. Outside actors weigh these costs against the benefits of membership and the pain of gang retribution if they defect. Comparative statics reveal how carceral policy affects this tradeoff, taking the maximum feasible burden as a measure of prison-gang capacity to project power.
I then focus attention on the extensive margin, recruitment of "entry-level" criminals, possibly for orchestrated violent actions. A key example is the PCC's recruitment of an impromptu army of nonmember youth to throw bombs and set fires during the 2006 terror attacks. The goal was less to tax existing affiliates (who are likely to be established criminals) than to induce multiple non-members (likely low-level criminals or "borderline" individuals in the gangs' social orbit) to take risky actions through a promise of "prison insurance" when and if incarcerated (Phillips 2006 Previewing the results, increases in severity raise gangs' power on the street whenever they are consolidated enough within prison to sufficiently mitigate the pain of incarceration. Crackdowns (i.e. increases in certainty) increase prison gangs' power on the streets unless they are sufficiently "targeted"-falling more heavily on those who follow, as opposed to disobey, gang edicts. Roughly speaking, entirely untargeted crackdowns strengthen gangs that are stronger inside than outside prison, but weaken them otherwise; I suggest this as a useful conceptual distinction between prison-and street gangs. I then consider crackdowns that simultaneously produce overcrowding or otherwise worsen prison conditions; these require an even higher level of targeting to avoid inadvertently strengthening the gang. Finally, addressing the long-standing "certainty vs. severity" debate (e.g. Beccaria 1819; Donohue 2007), the model reveals that "swift and certain" punishments (Kleiman 2009 ) can offset the gang-strengthening effects of crackdowns with shorter sentences.
To study the extensive margin, I incorporate Becker's classic model of crime by giving potential recruits a non-criminal outside option, since actors with little or no criminal history might realistically 'go straight.' This allows me to distinguish the 'individual effects' of policies (on the overall crime rate) from the 'collective effects' (on prison-gang coercive power). Harsher punishment and insufficiently targeted crackdowns are found to simultaneously aid gang recruiting while lowering the expected utility of all criminals, thus reducing overall crime.
Taxation (Intensive Margin)
Because the model is quite straightforward, I present the main results below somewhat informally; the appendix contains more formal versions of the propositions, as well as proofs and derivations.
The players are a gang G ("she") and an outside criminal actor, say a street-gang leader or autonomous drug dealer, S ("he"). G sets M as the price of membership or good standing. S then chooses whether to comply and carry out M or defect and "go it alone". 10 Nature (N ) then decides whether S is imprisoned or not, and payoffs are realized. The payoffs reflect the assumption that G rewards or punishes S depending on whether he has complied or not. Besides these rewards or punishments, carrying out M has two direct effects for S . First, it imposes a direct utility penalty of −τ, a kind of tax (though not necessarily in money). Second, it raises his probability of imprisonment-his "certainty" of punishment in criminological terms-from π (if S defects) to π ≥ π. 12 These dimensions are independent: if M is a pure money tax that police cannot easily observe, π might be very close to π, while τ reflects the size of the tax. Conversely, if M involves risky actions like assassination, we might have π π, but, if S doesn't mind killing beyond the added risk, τ ≈ 0.
Focusing on S 's payoffs, let j > 0 measure severity of punishment, including both sentence length and harshness of prison conditions. If S is imprisoned and has not complied, he suffers − j in full. Let y represent baseline profits from illicit activity that S earns by "going it alone". Since membership may permit efficiency gains from criminal cooperation, a collaborator receives β y where β ≥ 1.
Assume that the gang punishes defectors, inflicting a cost of γ ≥ 0 within prison and δ ≥ 0 on the outside. Finally, since S represents a street-gang leader facing a risk of incarceration regardless of compliance with G , I do not include a non-criminal, "go straight" option here.
14 This specification remains agnostic about what kind of gang G is: street gangs may also try to tax and coerce street-level actors, while offering both benefits to members and credibly threatening punishment for disobedience. Indeed, scholars have found origin to be a decreasingly useful criterion for distinguishing gangs (e.g. Hunt et al. 1993 ) as members of gangs that formed on the street are incarcerated (yielding power on the inside: α and γ ) and members of gangs that formed in prison are released but remain loyal (yielding power on the outside: β and δ). The model points to an alternative criterion: pro-incarceration policies have opposite effects on a gang's capacity to project power depending on its relative power inside vs. outside prison, suggesting a novel conceptual distinction between street gangs and prison gangs.
The outcome of interest is the maximum burden or "utility tax" that G can impose for any given risky action without provoking defection, τ * ( π). In this simple setup, the relative payoff to complying is increasing in all aspects of the gang's capacity to reward and punish; thus increases in α, β, γ or δ will all raise τ * . This is a source of positive feedback: if the gang uses τ * to increase any of these parameters, its future coercive power will be even greater. Exogenous increases in outside profits ( y) will also raise τ * whenever there is sufficient surplus from collective criminal activity relative to the increased risk of imprisonment it entails β >
As for the effects of carceral policy, it would be specious to assume that states directly and independently set j , π, and π; rather, I assume that policies affect these parameters jointly. Table 1 classifies policies into four broad types, based on these joint effects on severity ( j ) and certainty (π , and π ), which I test in turn. Table 1 . Policy interventions to be tested, defined by their effects on severity and certainty of incarceration.
Policy Type Effect on Severity: j Effect on Certainty: π and π Proposition 1a (Increases in severity strengthen consolidated gangs). Pure harshening policies (i.e. with no effect on certainty) will increase τ * whenever:
In words, pure harshening policies strengthen gangs that are sufficiently consolidated within prison.
Condition C pins down "sufficiently consolidated", and has a natural interpretation. Complying makes an outside actor higher values represent better-targeted crackdowns, and the origin is drawn at π π = 1, an untargeted crackdown. The horizontal dimension represents crackdowns' effect on severity, j . At the origin, crackdowns are "pure", with no effect on prison conditions or sentencing. To the right are crackdowns that, perhaps unintentionally, also increase severity via overcrowding and similar mechanisms. To the left are policies that offset increased certainty with deliberate reductions in severity. The shaded region corresponds to those policies that raise τ * , i.e. "strengthen the gang" while policies in the non-shaded region lower τ * , or "weaken the gang".
Empirically, many anti-gang sweeps poorly discriminate street-gang members from non-members, much less their compliance with prison-gang edicts. With that in mind, consider first the limiting case of a crackdown that is totally untargeted ( π = π and thus π π = 1) and is also "pure" in the sense that it has no effect on severity ( j = 0), shown as point (a) in Figure 3 .
Proposition 1b (Pure, untargeted crackdowns strengthen "prison gangs"). Any crackdown with no effect on j that raises π and π equally will increase τ
In words, untargeted pure crackdowns increase G 's coercive power whenever it is stronger within prison than on the street. Intuitively, if the membership benefits deriving from "prison insurance"
) are greater than those from improved criminal profits (β y − y), and if retribution is more likely inside prison than outside (γ > δ), then a higher chance of incarceration makes membership more valuable.
Proposition 1b suggests a useful criterion for differentiating prison-and street gangs: whether their total power to punish and reward is greater inside than outside prison. In other words, a prison-based criminal network can be defined as a gang whose outside coercive power is increased by an untargeted crackdown, like point (a) in Figure 3 . By this criterion, a street gang would be one whose capacity to impose burdens on members is weakened by a pure, untargeted crackdown, with the shaded region lying entirely below point (a).
For a prison gang thus defined, an untargeted crackdown increases coercive power on the street.
How targeted would a crackdown have to be to avoid strengthening the gang? We can define a critical degree of targeting, (denoted by ϕ * ) such that any crackdown whose degree of targeting is below this
will strengthen the gang. Algebra reveals that the critical level of targeting for a crackdown (ϕ * ) is a function of the model's parameters as well as the crackdown's effect on severity ( j ). This can be seen in Figure 3 , where ϕ * appears as an upward sloping line. 19 First, consider pure crackdowns with no effect on severity:
19 If Condition C did not hold, this line would slope downward.
Proposition 1c (Better-consolidated gangs require more targeting). The critical level of targeting for
crackdowns with no effect on severity is increasing in the "inside' parameters' α and γ , and decreasing in the "outside" parameters β, δ and y.
The model's main result is that insufficiently targeted crackdowns increase gangs' coercive power.
Condition T and Proposition 1c pin down "insufficiently targeted", revealing that the larger a gang's capacity to reward and punish inside vs. outside prison, the more targeted crackdowns must be to avoid strengthening it. Graphically, the more consolidated a gang is within prison, the higher point (b ) is relative to (a).
Thus far, the analysis has assumed that crackdowns only increase certainty. In reality, policies that increase incarceration rates are likely to increase severity as well, perhaps inadvertently, because of over- 
The term k indicates how large a reduction in severity is needed to offset an insufficiently targeted crackdown; in Figure 3 , it is the distance from (d ) to (e ). Holding the impact on non-members (π ) constant, better-targeted crackdowns require smaller offsets. 21 As for α, the more consolidated the gang, the larger the targeting gap, but, counterintuitively, the more efficacious any reduction in severity. Condition C K holds whenever the latter effect predominates. Graphically, a rise in α increases the slope of ϕ * , reducing k for points below C K . Overall, the result suggests that Kleiman's approach is particularly apt when prison gangs are strong and targeting is difficult.
Recruitment (Intensive Margin)
I now turn to the question of recruiting outside actors to take risky actions. The street-level actor S is now replaced by a continuum of potential recruits, indexed by their expected income from "go-italone" criminal activity [y, y] ; in this setting, y measures individuals' "criminal talent". I assume that G is interested in recruiting low-level foot soldiers for organized criminal actions, and focus on its capacity to recruit 'better' criminal types (i.e. higher y). As with the PCC's reliance on non-member youth to carry out terror attacks in 2006, 22 I assume recruits receive only "prison insurance", but no 20 Shorter sentences could also weaken gangs by giving them less time to learn incoming inmates' type, or to socialize new recruits (e.g. Biondi 2010, 98) , channels beyond the scope of this model. 21 But note that two crackdowns with the same Glaeser's (1999) simplified version of Becker's (1968) canonical model of crime.
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An individual y i is recruitable if she prefers C to both D and O. Formally, define the relevant cutpoints as:
For y * to be positive, and hence for anyone to be recruitable, Condition C must hold: α > Harsher sentences unambiguously make criminals worse off with respect to non-criminals, lowering the overall crime rate; at the same time, they increase the gang's ability to recruit as long as it is sufficiently consolidated to make prison-insurance recruitment viable.
Proposition 2b (Crackdowns reduce crime).
Any policy with π > 0 raises y D .
As long as crackdowns are not exclusively targeted at gang collaborators, they will always reduce overall crime. However, they also aid recruiting if not sufficiently targeted:
Proposition 2c (Untargeted 'pure' crackdowns always aid gang recruitment). For crackdowns ρ P C with no effect on severity, the critical level of targeting is ϕ * = π π . 24 For expositional simplicity, I focus on y's choices in a decision-theoretic framework. As above, y * as equilibrium outcome can be easily generated by assuming that G 's utility is increasing in y. 25 Formally, I assume that the volume of people G seeks to recruit, N R , is small compared to the total pool of recruitable actors:
dy. This is sounder than the alternative assumptions = 1) with no effect on severity will aid recruiting. Even a targeted crackdown, if it affects the risk differential by a factor less than the differential itself, increases G 's ability to recruit. This suggests diminishing returns: targeting raises the risk differential, which in turn makes further crackdowns more likely to be counterproductive.
As for overcrowding, Proposition 1d holds here as well: a seemingly sufficiently targeted policy, if it inadvertently worsens prison conditions, will still strengthen gangs. However, overcrowding will also increase the crackdown's crime-reducing effect, since ∂ y D ∂ j > 0. Also as before, the gang-strengthening effect of an insufficiently targeted crackdown can be offset with a reduction in severity:
Proposition 2d (Offsetting 'more certainty' with 'less severity'). Say a 'pure' crackdown with no effect on severity is insufficiently targeted, so that Again, better targeting requires smaller offsetting reductions in severity. 26 In this case, increases in α do not affect the "targeting gap", and so unambiguously reduce the size of offset needed. Such an offset will necessarily reduce deterrence, but crime will still fall if the targeting gap is not too large, or, ironically, if α is high enough.This suggests that when prison gangs are very strong, taking a "swift and certain" approach to punishment is a particularly appropriate strategy.
Empirical Evidence
The model predicts that prison gangs' capacity to project power grows under the following conditions:
Prison gangs are sufficiently consolidated to effectively reward compliance and punish defection within prison; P: Pro-incarceration policies increase the certainty (i.e. likelihood of incarceration) and / or severity of punishment (i.e. length and harshness of sentences, overcrowding, etc.); 26 The caveat of note 21 still applies, however. . I show that
Conditions C , P , and T were met, and that these periods indeed witnessed important expansions in prison-gang projection of power onto the streets. I focus on positive cases because rarely can one distinguish the true absence of prison gangs from a lack of data, particularly since gangs and authorities alike may seek to hide or downplay gang power. Nonetheless, I do briefly explore one well-documented negative case, Nicaragua. I then address these case-selection issues and related obstacles to strong causal inference and larger-n analyses. Improving data for more systematic testing is a critical avenue for further research. it was powerful enough to instigate its first "mega-rebellion": simultaneous mutinies in 30 prisons, involving 28,000 prisoners (Dias and Salla 2013, 397) . In El Salvador, the arrival in the 1990s of mara members deported mostly from California-where they were themselves taxed and governed by the Eme prison gang 28 (Valdez 2011, 28-29) -turned a vast collection of small, local youth gangs into clikas ('cliques') of the prison-based MS and M18 mara franchises (Cruz 2010) . By the early 2000s, officials were segregating prisons by gang (Cruz 2010, 391) , giving each mara a consolidated base of operations.
Condition P : Certainty and severity of punishment increased. In all three cases, mass incarceration policies produced, over roughly two decades, a steady increase in incarceration rates from about 100 per 100,000 residents to over 400 ( Figure 5 ). These periods of "carceral hyperinflation" (Wacquant 27 Conditions C and T are stated formally in Section 3; Condition P is implicit in the analysis. 6.50 [1980 − 2002] 8.11 [1990 − 2012] 5.05 [1992 − 2012] 2.62 [1992 − 2012] Inmates per Bed [Year] 1.96 [2007] 1.87 [2012] 3.25 [2012] 1.28 [2010] Recidivism 67.5% 70% > 50% > 90% (maras) NA Figure 5 . Incarceration rates and key events that revealed prison gangs' capacity to project power. Sources: see Appendix B.
Condition T : The degree of targeting was low. Carceral expansion was driven in part by intensified law enforcement against drug trafficking and other gang-related activities. In São Paulo, such efforts
were not targeted at criminal organizations, but rather on peripheral areas generally, while inequities in the criminal justice system guaranteed that incarceration was far more likely for poorer defendants, even for relatively minor crimes (IBA 2010, 8-10 affiliates may conceal their activities and contacts. However, when it is employed, the resulting revelatory events-including abrupt changes in the structure of street-level criminal markets, establishment of control over peripheral areas, and orchestrated violence / protest-provide reliable observations of prison gangs' accumulation of power over street-level agents. Figure 5 shows, for each case, one early and salient example:
• September 1993: Mexican Mafia leaders convoke mass public gatherings of California's Sureño street gangs to impose the "Eme Edict", a system of "complete vertical integration" involving a ban on drive-by shootings, loyalty to the Eme, and a tax on drug profits (Rafael 2007, 36-39) .
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• May 2006: São Paulo, the world's third-largest city, is held hostage when the PCC instigates synchronized riots in some 90 prisons and street-level attacks on hundreds of civilian and police targets, bringing the city to a standstill for days, until authorities made concessions.
• September 2010: Imprisoned leaders of El Salvador's MS-13 and M-18 maras join forces to induce-via threats of mass violence by street-level affiliates against city busses-a transportation strike that shuts down the capital for three days, demanding improved prison conditions and the veto of an anti-gang law (Wolf 2012, 86) .
These events constitute "smoking-guns": they could not have occurred if prison gangs lacked the projective power to induce outside affiliates to pay taxes, submit to dictates, and take highly risky actions. 31 As measurements, they are likely lower bounds, since gangs need not have "maxed out" their 30 Valdez (2011) dates the edict to 1992.
31 Smoking-gun tests are sufficient but not necessary conditions for inference; thus the absence of revelatory events cannot be taken as evidence that prison gangs lack power on the streets. Further comparative evidence comes from Nicaragua, which shares several factors often blamed for the rise of the maras: a history of civil war, easy availability of firearms, widespread poverty and unemployment, and a long-standing presence of neighborhood gangs. Yet the maras made no inroads into Nicaragua, its native gangs never developed into prison-based criminal networks, and its homicide rate remains far lower than its northern neighbors (Cruz 2011; Yashar 2012) . Certainly, one important factor was the relative lack of returning mara deportees from the United States. Cruz, however, argues that this explanation is easily "oversold" (2011, 139) , drawing attention to equally dramatic differences 32 That the early revelatory events shown above all occurred as incarceration rates reached the 350-400 / 100,000 range is suggestive, though hardly conclusive given the small number of cases.
in anti-gang policies. Nicaraguan officials, many of them former insurgents, pioneered a preventive approach (Rocha 2010, 33 ) that sought to de-stigmatize non-violent youth gangs rather than criminalize them. Unlike El Salvador's untargeted mano dura sweeps, Nicaragua first categorized groups, then directed repression only at the more serious organized crime outfits, while bringing vulnerable youth into community programs (Cruz 2011, 140-143) . This avoided large increases in incarceration, and suggests that repression was also better targeted (in the sense of Condition T ). Comparing case studies of Nicaragua with El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, Cruz (2011, 155) concludes that "the mechanism that perhaps most facilitated gang organization and recruitment" in the latter three "was the simultaneous incarceration of thousands of youth gang members and wannabes."
Unfortunately, such comparative leverage is rare, because negative cases cannot generally be distinguished from missing data. For most countries, including high-incarceration authoritarian regimes like Russia and China, there is little reliable information about prison gangs one way or the other. Absense of evidence of prison-gang power is not evidence of its absence, however, because both gangs and authorities have incentives to deny or downplay such power, and even honest measurement is likely to be biased downward. Even in the United States, prison-gang secrecy and official "gang denial" severely hamper detection and assessment (Fleisher and Decker 2001, 3; Fong and Buentello 1991, 66-7; Knox 2012) ; in Latin America, reliable information is even rarer (Macaulay 2007, 630) . between these (erroneous) measures and sharply rising incarceration would appear as strong evidence that incarceration has zero or even negative effect on prison-gang projection of power. Such a finding would be proven entirely spurious the following day, once PCC street attacks had brought São Paulo to a halt, and the positive correlation between incarceration and prison-gang projection became apparent.
To avoid the extreme measurement error and spurious correlation that can occur when zeros cannot be distinguished from missing data, I focus here on clearly positive cases. The tradeoff is a reduction in inferential leverage: the available evidence demonstrates the plausibility of the model's prediction that mass incarceration strengthens prison gangs, but can make no claims to strong causal identification.
More rigorous testing will require reliable, comparable assessments of street-level prison-gang power (or lack thereof ) over space and time; I discuss potential steps forward in the conclusion. Meanwhile, in such data-poor environments, the "modeling dialogue" (Myerson 1992, 64 ) is especially helpful in clarifying concepts and focusing empirical research on relevant phenomena. In this case, as Proposition 2 showed, crime rates are no measure of prison-gang power, since the same policies that reduce crime may strengthen prison-gang power on the street.
Implications: The Possibility of Counterproductive Punishment
If prison gangs used projection of power only to predate on street gangs, then increased incarceration might merely raise prison gangs' relative criminal income. However, contemporary prison gangs use projection of power in ways that are problematic for state authority, even if they sometimes reduce crime rates. This poses a double threat to inferences about the effects of increased incarceration. First, we may inadvertently attribute some reduction in crime to individual effects (incapacitation and deterrence)
that was in fact due to increased organization of criminal activity by prison gangs. Second, we may be implicitly equating crime reduction with improved rule of law and state authority, failing to account for the slow, relatively hidden expansion of criminal authority at the expense of the state's.
This section addresses these two concerns. First, I categorize the uses to which prison gangs have put projection of power. Then, I conceptually distinguish their effects on crime (sometimes positive, sometimes negative) from their effects on authority (usually negative). Finally, I draw these strands together in the framework of Figure 1 , conjecturing that beyond some point, state efforts to bolster the rule of law through increased incarceration become counterproductive.
Uses of Projection of Power
The case of Rio's Comando Vermelho (CV) is useful for theory-building but not for testing: incarceration data is not available for 1970-90, when it first took control of Rio's prisons, then projected outward to dominate the city's favelas and retail drug trade. I discuss three key uses of projection practiced by the CV, then show how the Eme, PCC, and Salvadoran maras have engaged in similar actions.
Organization of local criminal activity: Local illicit markets, especially retail drug markets, tend to be fragmented and unstable. Street gangs and small operators rarely establish thoroughgoing control beyond small pieces of home turf (Hagedorn 1994; Skolnick et al. 1990 ), despite significant investments in arms and soldiers . Yet as Skarbek (2011) has shown, there is a potential surplus to be extracted by any group capable of providing criminal governance. Rio de Janeiro's CV used a code of mutual-aid among its members to systematically oust or subdue incumbent drug retailers from a majority of the city's favelas in the 1980s (Amorim 1993; Lima 1991) , then hold that territory in the face of decades of extreme police repression. Comparing four Brazilian cities, Lessing (2008) found this level of drug-market organization unique to Rio, and plausibly due to the CV's prison-based governance structure.
Parallel Power: Prison-gang authority can extend to entire peripheral regions and populations, providing order, justice, and other public goods, and effectively supplanting state authority. In Rio de Janeiro, an entire generation of favela residents has been born and raised under the armed dominion of prison-coordinated drug syndicates, while the state's presence was largely limited to intermittent, corrupt, and highly lethal police invasions (e.g. Arias 2006; Leeds 1996) . As a founding CV member explained, "We catechize the favela residents and show them that the government cannot help them or see their side of things. So we give food, medicine, clothes, textbooks.... We even resolve domestic disputes; there can't be trouble or else the police will enter" (Amorim 1993, 162) .
Orchestrated Protest and Violence as a Bargaining Chip:
These tactics work both inside and outside prison. The CV-whose founding members watched the leftist militants they were housed with successfully protest their way to amnesty-regularly organized hunger strikes and petitions (Lima 1991) , often coercing the larger inmate population into adherence. 34 The CV has also instigated prison riots, often in multiple prisons simultaneously, as a means of pressuring or punishing officials. 35 On the outside, the CV has frequently induced its foot soldiers in favelas to carry out city-wide shutdowns of businesses, burn busses, and machine-gun public buildings and police stations (e.g. Penglase 2005), usually to pressure officials to slacken carceral policies.
Projection of Power in Tested Cases:
Like the CV, California's Eme and São Paulo's PCC have both used their coercive power to organize street-level drug markets. Yet whereas the Eme's power is limited to areas dominated by southern Californian latino gangs (Skarbek 2011) , the PCC operates throughout the entire urban periphery of São Paulo as wholesaler, tax collector, and arbiter of disputes among myriad small-scale retailers 36 (Feltran 2010; Hirata 2010, 289) . It has imposed a violencelimiting lei do crime ("criminal code of conduct") (Telles and Hirata 2009, 53) through an astonishing system of trials, via cell-phone conferencing, before a jury of jailed PCC elders (Feltran 2010) .
In El Salvador (as well as Guatemala and Honduras) the maras organized extortion rackets, perhaps because retail drug markets were too small. Leaders introduced professionalized hierarchies, stricter and savvier codes of outside behavior (e.g. prohibiting gang tattoos that made members easy targets for anti-gang enforcement) (Cruz 2010, 390-392; Savenije 2009; Wolf 2012, 86-87) and a system of prison-coordinated and -taxed extortion (Fogelbach 2010, 439 ) of businesses and public transportation known as la renta (the rent) (Aguilar and Carranza 2008, 23 individually, because they haven't treated us individually, nor have they pursued or locked us up individually" (Cruz 2010, 393) .
In terms of parallel power, the Eme has made minor efforts, coordinating offensives by affiliated Sureño gangs against black residents in Los Angeles (United States of America v. Rios et al. 2011) and Norteños governed by Eme rival La Nuestra Familia in central California (Reynolds and Sánchez 2003; Valdez 2011, 32) . Maras, by contrast, play a dominant role in neighborhoods throughout El Salvador.
The PCC has relentlessly expanded its presence throughout São Paulo's urban periphery since 2000 (Biderman et al. 2014) , and its dispute-resolution and order-provision services now extend to a broad population poorly served by state institutions (Feltran 2010; Hirata 2010) . As one detective noted: control over street-level behavior. Though the government initially denied any role in the truce, top mara leaders were returned from isolation to low-security prisons and allowed cell phones, among other concessions (Economist 2012) . Once the homicide drop became undeniable, the government began to take credit, inviting security ministers from Guatemala and Honduras to discuss exporting the Sal- vadoran 'experiment' (Membreño 2012a) . Gang leaders later 'deepened' the truce, curbing extortion in exchange for reduced police patrols (Membreño 2012b) . The efficacy of the truce gave maras important political leverage as well: bargaining for jobs programs, they threatened an increase in violence were the truce to collapse (Economist 2014) . Indeed, violence surged in 2014 as a new government was elected that disowned the truce and any future negotiations. Mara leaders then reached a new truce on their own, again halving homicide rates, aiming, perhaps, to gain leverage against a hostile administration (Pachicho 2015). In July 2015, they returned to violent strategies, inducing another transportation strike (Malkin 2015) .
Projection of Power as a Collective Threat to State Authority
Disentangling the perniciousness of prison-gang power from its sometimes salutary effect on crime requires careful conceptualization. Canonical notions of state authority center on the ability to lay down rules that "subjects" ultimately submit to voluntarily (Weber 1947) . Coercion may be needed to establish authority (Tilly 1985) , and assure citizens that free-riders will be punished (Levi 1989 ), but order, once imposed, is self-reinforcing, in part due to the surplus it produces (Olson 1993 crackdowns increase coercive power on the street, reinforcing their ability to impose criminal authority.
Regardless of whether this criminal authority is exercised in ways that increase or reduce street-level crime and violence, the effect on state authority is likely to be negative.
Counterproductive Punishment
Returning to Figure 1 , the individual effects of incarceration on state authority-essentially the opposite of its effects on crime-are relatively easy to measure. The collective, authority-eroding effects of incarceration are far less visible. The causal pathway is neither obvious-it is modeled here for the first time, to the best of my knowledge-nor immediate: from consolidation to projection can take years or decades. Moreover, measurement error may worsen as gangs grow powerful, accumulate corrupting illicit rents, and give even honest officials incentives to prevent accurate assessments of prison-gang power.
38 Interview and visit, Quetzaltepeque Prison, El Salvador, May 24, 2013. 39 Above, I suggested defining 'street gang' as those whose leverage is reduced by untargeted crackdowns.
Another asymmetry concerns "returns to scale". Theory predicts, and empirical results mostly confirm, that the marginal crime-reducing effect of punishment is decreasing (Kleiman 2009; Useem and Piehl 2008) , and may even become negative beyond some point (Chen and Shapiro 2007; Gaes and Camp 2009; Liedka et al. 2006) . 40 For this reason, the solid line in Figure 1 is drawn as convex, with a confidence interval at its right tail that crosses zero.
In contrast, the marginal collective effects of punishment may be increasing over the relevant range (indicated by the concavity of the dashed line in Figure 1 ). First, as the model shows, the stronger prison gangs grow within prison, the more crackdowns increase their power outside; there will be positive feedback if gangs use the ensuing surpluses to further consolidate. Second, as incarceration becomes part of the life course for some groups (Pettit and Western 2004) , prison-gang initiation may become a rite of passage, and obtaining "prison insurance" a widespread norm. Finally, the focal-point effects that help explain how prison-gangs quickly expand their authority from core members to larger constituencies are likely to be tipping-point phenomena: even modest increases in coercive power could have decisive effects. For example, in Los Angeles, the MS first brazenly opposed Eme taxation, then, as reprisals escalated, not only relented but amended its name (to MS-18) to proudly proclaim its Eme affiliation (Valdez 2011, 28-29 The logical consequence of the foregoing is the inflection point of Figure 1 , beyond which additional incarceration undermines overall state authority, even if crime rates fall. In this view, prison gangs do not just produce hidden costs that can lead to higher-than-optimal incarceration. Rather, they may fundamentally limit states' capacity to restore authority through punishment, no matter the price.
40 Kleiman (2009) emphasizes, however, that well-planned "dynamic concentration" policing may have tipping-point effects, and hence increasing returns. 41 The letter M (for Eme) is the eighteenth letter of the alphabet. Ultimately, though, such an abdication may erode state authority and constitute a net loss for society.
Conclusion
My core claim is simple: the more likely a potential criminal is to go to prison, and the longer he will stay if he goes, the more he is willing to "pay" for good standing with a prison gang that can protect him on the inside. I formally analyze this logic, distinguishing the individual effects (on overall crime) of mass incarceration policies from the collective (on prison-gang power). The model predicts that harsher sentences and poorly-targeted crackdowns strengthen prison gangs that already hold power within prison. These predictions fit an initial empirical assessment: in three prominent cases, mass incarceration policies and anti-gang sweeps not only failed to eliminate consolidated prison gangs, but seem to have fomented qualitative leaps in their projective capacity. These new uses of projection, I
showed, constitute serious threats to state authority, though they can have varied effects on crime rates.
The implication is that increased incarceration can strengthen criminal authority at the expense of the state, even if crime falls. Finally, if gang-strengthening effects have increasing returns-plausibly due to the tipping-point nature of authority-then state efforts to restore law and order through increased punishment may end up only eroding overall state authority. Like public torture before it (Foucault 1977) , mass incarceration could become a self-defeating form of punishment.
These are big claims; further research is needed to fully test them. Theoretical work should focus on prison gang leadership, to better understand why, when, and how it deploys its projective power.
Empirically ignore. Yet in the starkest cases, they have transformed the prison system-in theory the core of the coercive apparatus-into an operational headquarters' for organized criminal defiance of state authority.
Perhaps recommendations based on prison-gang research (Skarbek 2014) will yield more effective antigang programs; thus far such efforts have had only marginal impact (e.g. Knox 2012) . And since incarceration has become, in the modern era, the punishment upon which all state coercion ultimately rests, what these cases suggest is a fundamental limit to state power.
